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''The Rock of Accomplishment"
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Ortona
Shaun R.G. Brown
he struggle for Ortona is one of the best
known battles fought by Canadians in the
Second World War. MatthewHalton, theCBC's
chief radio correspondent in Italy, made "Mora
River" and "Ortona" household words in 1943
and since then veterans as well as war
correspondents and historians have offered
numerous accounts of that December in
Abruzzi. 1

T

This article focuses on the role of the Loyal
Edmonton Regiment in clearing the town of
Ortona, but it is important to remind ourselves
of the context within which the battle was
fought. The Allies had invaded the Italian
mainland to force Italy out of the war, to
establish air bases for the strategic bombers,
and to draw off the maximum number of
German troops. Hitler's decision to stand
south of Rome was all that sensible Allied
planners could have hoped for. The Foggia
plains were suitable for air bases and the
Germans poured resources into Italy to meet
the Allied advance and into the Balkans to
replace the Italian Army.
Hitler gave Field Marshal Albert Kesselring
specific orders to fight "a delaying action only
as far as the line Gaeta-Ortona. This line will
be held," the Fuhrer insisted. Eisenhower,
though still in command of overall Allied
operations in Italy, saw the theatre increasingly
in terms of its significance for Operation
Overlord. On October 25th he informed the
British Prime Minister that:

Left: Personnel of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment
during streetf1.9hting in San Leonardo di Ortona, Italy,
10 December 1943.
(Photo by F.G. Whitcombe/NAC PA 114487)

My principal commanders and I are in complete
agreement that it is essential for us to retain the
initiative until the time approaches for mounting
Overlord, otherwise the enemy will himself seize the
initiative and may force us on the defensive
prematurely, thus enabling him to withdraw divisions
from our front in time to oppose Overlord. If we can
keep him on his heels until early spring, then the
more divisions he uses in a counter-offensive against
us the better it will be for Overlord and it then makes
little difference what happens to us if Overlord is a
success. 2

This clear and realistic appraisal of the
purposes of the Italian campaign did not appeal
to Churchill. The Prime Minister was still
fearful of Overlord and anxious for a major
victory in Italy which would allow him to argue
against the withdrawal of troops and landing
craft for the invasion of the south of France.
General Harold Alexander was left with the
task of devising a plan which would meet
Eisenhower's objectives even if it failed to fully
realize Churchill's dreams. He developed a
three-phased scheme which required
Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery's
Eighth Army to advance north across the Sangro
River to capture Pescara and gain control ofthe
important Rome-Pescara highway. Eighth
Army was then to turn west, attacking Rome
from the flank while Lieutenant-General Mark
Clark's Fifth Army attacked towards Rome
through the Liri valley. Finally, a seaborne
landing atAnzio, south of Rome, would secure
the Alban hills outflanking the Germans from
the west. 3 If all went well the Allies would be in
Rome for Christmas or early January, but even
if the terrain, the weather and the enemy
denied capture of the Italian capital, the real
purposes of the campaign would still be fulfilled.
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Old woman on road strewn with destroyed Gennan tanks and guns, 13 December 1943.

(Photo by F.G. Whitcombe/NAC PA 136196)

Eighth Army began its attack on the 28th
November and in less than two days British,
Indian and New Zealand troops had cracked
through the Bemhardt line shattering the 76th
Panzer Corps and forcing Kesselring to send
the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division and the
Fourth Parachute Regiment to re-establish the
Adriatic front north of the Mora River.
Montgomery concluded that a further push to
Pescara was impossible without a pause to
build up supplies and work on the bridges
across the Sangro which were threatened by
heavy rains. He also decided to rest 78th
Division and replace it with l st Canadian
Division.
The New Zealand Division led off the
renewed offensive, but its objective, Orsogna,
could not be captured easily. 4 The Canadians
were ordered into action early to relieve some
of the pressure on the New Zealanders and on
the night of 5th/6th December, lst and 2nd
Brigades attacked across the Mora. The initial
battles for Villa Rozatti (The Princess Patricia's

Light Infantry [PPCLI]) and San Leonardo
(Seaforth Highlanders) led the enemy to commit
the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to a
series of sharp counterattacks. On the right
flank, the Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment's bridgehead, which was supposed
to be a diversion, allowed the divisional
commander, Major-General Chris Vokes, to
renew the attack on San Leonardo with a "right
hook" carried out by the Royal Canadian
Regiment. This too was unsuccessful, but San
Leonardo was finally taken by a battle group
from the Calgary Tanks and Seaforth
Highlanders. 5
The German defence of the Mora had to this
point been a skilled and successful delaying
operation. But the enemy now decided to wipe
out the Canadian bridgehead which controlled
the coastal highway. The attack by the 90th
Panzer Grenadiers' reserve battalions
demonstrated the difficulties faced by the
attacking force in Italy. The Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment were "behind well-
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prepared defence zones which had been
carefully registered for artillery and mortar fire
and covered by machine-guns set up to fire on
fixed lines. "6 The German attack, preceded by
an artillery and mortar barrage, was cut to
pieces by observed mortar fire and disciplined
small arms and machine gun fire. The loss of
close to 200 men forced the German Corps
Commander to order a withdrawal to the edge
of Ortona behind a deep ravine the Canadians
would call the "Gully." [A full description of the
battle for the Gully is contained in the shaded
boxes on pages 14-15.]

remain unclear, General Herr, commanding
76 Panzer Corps, decided to defend Ortona
with two parachute battalions. There has been
much ink spilled over the battle for Ortona and
it has been suggested that the Canadians
should have simply by-passed the town. 7 In
fact no such choice existed. If the Canadians
had limited their advance to 1st Brigade sector
the attack up the Ricco valley would have been
opposed by the full weight of 1st Parachute
Division. Ortona and the coastal highway were
essential objectives if the advance north was to
be continued and sustained logistically.

The collapse of the German position at
the Gully ought to have led to a general
withdrawal to a ridge line north of the Tesoro
and Arielli rivers. This is certainly what
Montgomery anticipated, but for reasons that

******
rtona is an ancient city founded by the
Trojans after the fall ofTroy. The northern
part, called the "Old Town," consists of

O
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The Battle for the Gully
(from the British Official History of the Mediterranean Campaign)
"From Ortona the road to Orsogna
ran along a low ridge for rather more
than three miles. Below this ridge on
the south side there was a narrow deep
ravine. Some farm-buildings were dotted along the ridge, notablyCasa Berardi
which we can take as near the ridge's
western end. Highway 16 crossed the
ravine and ridge at their mid-point and
led to Cider Cross-Roads. Ravine and
ridge formed the Gully, which the Germans were determined to defend. There
was no obvious way of outflanking it
because the sodden ground discouraged
cross-country manoeuvres, while only a
bad track led from S. Leonardo to a point
about a mile west ofCasa Berardi. The
Canadian Division spent from 11th to
19th December in forcing this position
at a cost of over 1,000 casualties. The
defence was conducted by Colonel
Heilmann of 3rd Parachute Regiment
with his own 2nd and 3rd battalions,
2nd Battalion 1st Parachute Regiment,
the battered 200th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, a battalion of 36lst Panzer
Grenadier Regiment, 90th Engineer
Battalion, and detachments of tanks
from 190th Panzer Abteilung and 26th

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

Panzer Regiment. These troops were
not all simultaneously engaged. The
battle was fought in fair and foul
weather, on boggy ground, in a tangle of
olive trees and vineyards sprinkled with
mines and booby-traps. From the 11th
to 19th December 5th Corps' artillery
fired about 3,000 tons of ammunition.
The details of dogged attacks by the
Canadians and of the German's resolute
defence and fierce counter-attacks are
too many for the scale of this narrative.
What follows is descriptive analysis.
On the morning of lOth December
the Edmontons and a squadron of the
Calgary Regiment reached the gully so
quickly that at 10 a.m. Colonel Jefferson
(commanding officer of the Edmontons)
signalled "We are now proceeding on
final objective." Slashing mortar and
machine gun fire soon blew away this
hope. Vokes seems early to have accepted the front of little more than two
thousand yards which lay before him,
and to have resolved to go straight for
his objective. His reasons were the sodden ground which would hinder crosscountry movement; a feeling that the
objective was very close and would fall

to a quick punch and therefore a wish
not to spend time in fully concentrating
his division. Moreover the Canadians
had a predilection for small attacks,
powerfully supported, on narrow fronts,
markedly shown in the fighting from
Assoro to Regalbuto in Sicily.
The Canadian Division made eight
main attacks on the Gully. Of these, if
we set aside overlappings and diversions, five were by single battalions, two
by two battalions, and the final attack
was by three battalions following each
other in three closely successive phases.
Armour, not in great strength, took part
in all attacks. All the attacks except the
last failed because momentum was lost
owing to the same general causes. The
enemy's fire, much of it cross-fire, was
very heavy and his counter-attacks were
frequent, determined, and well-timed.
The Canadian infantry often "lost" their
artillery support because of the ordinary mischances of battle and because
the artillery was fighting at a disadvantage. This was because the succession of
attacks was so
(Continued on next page)
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(continued from previous page)
quick that often two or three fire plans
were being prepared at once, largely
from not altogether accurate maps. The
resulting fire programs were oftenfaulty,
and frequent calls for heavy Defensive
Fire to meet counter-attacks sent them
further astray.
The key phase of the battle occurred
probably on the 13th and 14th December. On the 13th, one of the rare occasions on which the fighter-bombers could
operate in strength, a frontal attack
towards Cider Cross-Roads by the
Carleton and York Regiment, and attacks on its right and left by PPCLI and
the West Novas failed. But meanwhile
two small fighting reconnaissances produced unexpected results. On the left
flank a bad track led from S. Leonardo to
the Ortona road a mile west of Casa
Berardi. Two small parties-"B" Squadron of the Ontarios and a platoon of
West Novas, and four tanks of the Ontario's "C" Squadron with "A" Company

of the Seaforth Highlanders - indepep_dentlyfol!owed this track, foup.d "soft
spots" on theGerman right flank, slaughtered some\surprised detachments, and
almost reached Cas a Berardi. The press
of the main battle made it impossible at
once to exploitthe opportunity, but Vokes
tl).tnedhiseyetothis route. On the 14th
December he launched the Royal 22e
Regiment along it with "C" Squadron of
the Ontario Regiment, while .the PPCLI
attacked frontally. The Germans were
now guardingtheirrightflank, ):mt there
followed a splendid feat of Canadian
arms. Captain Paul Triquet with his "C"
Company of the Royal 22e and the Ontario's tanks captured Casa Berardi by
sheer, relentless fighting and a furious
determination to win. In Casa Berardi,
Triquet, who had ouly fifteen men and
four tanks, gave the time-honoured order "Ils ne passeront pas." Nor did the
Germans pass, for by 3 a.m. on the 15th
Colonel Bernatchez had collected a larger
force and had consolidated. Captain

Triquet was later awarded the Victoria
Cross.
Vokes now sent another squadron of
tanks to Casa Berardi and ordered another frontal attack by the Carleton and
York, believing that this and the flanking threat from Casa Berardi would
make the defence collapse. The attack
failed. But the events of the 13th and
14th had seriously worried Heilmann
and Baade; their immediate reserves
were all committed; and they now blessed
the two-day respite which followed the
failure of the Canadian attack on the
15th. On the 18th Vokes launched a
carefully staged attack from west ofCasa
Berardi in three phases with the support offighter·bombers. This attack by
the 48th Highlanders, the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Hastings and Prince
Edward Regiment, and the Three Rivers Regiment, was admirably executed,
and succeeded, not without very sharp
fighting. By dusk on the 19th the Gully
and Cider Cross-Roads passed into
Canadian hands."B

extremely narrow streets with most buildings
connected by common walls. The town is
dominated by two massive towers, a 15th
century fortress perched on the promontory
above the harbour, and the cathedral of St.
Thomas about two hundred metres inland. In
1943 the coastal highway entered the built-up
area about eight hundred metres from the
centre of the city.

operating with just three rifle companies of 60
men each. Reinforcing drafts were on their
way forward but did not reach Ortona until the
24th of December. In the words of the
regimental historian, "It is perhaps fortunate
that most of them did not arrive until the battle
was virtually over, Ortona was no place for new
hands or for men who did not know each
other." 9

There are three open squares in Ortona:
Piazza della Vittorio in the southern, newer
portion of the town, Piazza Municipale at the
junction of the old and new towns, and Piazza
San Tomasso in the old town, a few metres
from the castle. There was no possibility of an
advance along the sea front and a deep ravine
precluded attack from the west.

Major A. J. Rudd, then a sergeant and
Platoon Commander in "A" Company of the
Loyal Edmon tons, described his entry into the
town:

The Loyal Edmontons entered the operation
well below strength and by the third day were
Left: Infantry of the Edmonton Regiment and tanks of

the Three Rivers Regiment, Ortona, 23 Dec 1943.
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 114030)

The battalion advanced into Ortona with two
companies up, A and B, on the left and right of the
main street. Covered by Bren gunners, the lead
sections closed up to the door, the section commander
would toss in a "36" or "69" hand grenade and then
the section would rush in to clear the bottom floor.
We tried to gain the upstairs as soon as possible. 10
The Jerry defences were very good, and obviously
well-planned. Machine guns were always mutually
supporting and they even had tanks hull down in
bombed-out houses. Defended buildings were

15

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/2

6

Brown: “The Rock of Accomplishment”: The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Orto

Right: Lance Corporal E. A. Harris.
Loyal Edmonton Regiment in Ortona,
21 December 1943.
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 114490)
Below: A patrolfrom the Loyal Eddies in
Ortona.
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163932)

barricaded with sandbags and all kinds
of household goods. The windows were
screened with chicken wire to keep out
grenades. They set up some first class
booby traps. You might see a nice
Bible or piece of stain glass lying about
a house. Items like these were usually
connected to at least a pound of
explosive. This certainly discouraged
looting."

The first day's fighting had
brought the Edmontons and "C"
Squadron of the Three Rivers
Regiment to the Piazza Vittoria at
the southern edge of the old town.
Here they discovered that the
German engineers had blocked the
side streets with rubble from
demolished houses. The "paras"
hoped to entice the Canadians to advance
down the Corso Vittorio Emanuele to the Piazza

Municipale which would become a killing
ground. Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Jefferson
had other ideas. He insisted that the companies
take their time planning platoon -size operations
against one or two houses. Where possible a
tank would be used to blast down walls at short
range. More often the Edmonton's six-pounder
anti-tank guns were brought into play. A
platoon commander explains their role:
We used the anti-tanks in an unique way. The shells
could not penetrate the granite walls, sometimes 4ft.
thick. So we just put them through the windows and
they bounced around inside much like they would in
an enemy tank doing horrible damage. 12

It was a battle of great innovation and adaption.

All the hardware of the infantryman was brought
to bear against his entrenched foe.
We preferred to clear houses from the upstairs down.
If we couldn't get through the windows, we
"mouseholed." The "Beehive" charges we used would
kill any Germans in the adjacent rooms and we
followed right through immediately. The "36"
grenades could be dropped downstairs before we

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
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A Shennan of the Ontario Regiment firing at Gennan positions in a nearby house.
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163933)
carried on to clear the lower rooms. This was a basic
difference between our approach and the Jerry tactics.
When they came into a house it was on the ground
floor. Trying to return the favour of our grenades was
disastrous for them. Their old "potato mashers··
would rattle back down the stairs to explode at their
feet. 13

By now the name Ortona had captured
world headlines. Matthew Halton, Ralph Allen,
as well as the British war correspondent,
Christopher Buckley, never hesitated to follow
their stories right into the firing line. One of
Buckley's stories read:

The individual rifleman took on two
additional burdens in Ortona, primarily
because of the uniqueness of the struggle. The
first was grenades. In addition to the one
hundred rounds of rifle ammunition, each
man carried ten or twelve high explosive and
two or three "75" anti-tank grenades. The
other item that came into vogue was the steel
helmet, according to Rudd: "Before arriving in
Ortona, none of our chaps wore them. Then
everyone was clamouring for a tin hat. A lot of
lives were saved by tin hats when the bricks
started to tumble." 14

What a strange clutter of humanity it was. There
were some five or six Canadian soldiers, there were
old women, and there were children innumerable. A
painter of genius - Goya, perhaps - might have
done justice to the scene .... In the half-darkened
room the pasta for the mid-day meal was simmering
over the fire in the corner. Haggard, prematurelyaged women kept emerging shyly, one after the other
from some inner chamber where an old man, the
grandfather of the children, was dying .... Another
old man was uttering maledictions against Mussolini.
Then his wife surprisingly produced a jeroboam of
Marsala and a half-dozen glasses. She moved around
the soldiers filling and re-filling their glasses. The
children clambered over the Canadian soldiers and

17

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/2

8

Brown: “The Rock of Accomplishment”: The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Orto

clutched them convulsively every time one of our
anti-tank guns, located only a half dozen paces from
the door of the house, fired down the street in the
direction of one of the German machine gun nests.
Soon each of us had a squirming. terrified child in
our arms. The old lady went on serving Marsala. 15

Jefferson had been allotted "D" Company
of the Seaforths on the 22nd and the next day
the remainder of the battalion arrived to clear
the left flank while the Edmontons concentrated
on the area between the main street and the
harbour.

A Gennan soldier captured in Ortona.
(Photo by T.F. Rowe/NAC PA 107934)

On December 24th, resistance stiffened.
Major-General Vokes asked Brigadier
Hoffmeister if further operations should be
cancelled or delayed, but Hoffmeister was
confident. The German paratroopers were, he
told Vokes, taking a dreadful beating and
Brigade morale would suffer if they were not
allowed to finish the job. 16
The Loyal Edmonton War Diary noted more
paratroops had been thrown into battle. In
addition, the Germans brought in flame
throwers to which the Edmontons answered by
calling in fire from 17 -pounders on the coastal
road. On approaching the Piazza Municipale,
"D" company under the command ofMajorJ.R.
Stone, was halted by intense fire for the entrance
to the square was covered by no less than five
machine guns. Private C.G. Rattray was
dispatched with two comrades and crawling
through the rubble, disdaining snipers and
grenade throwers, managed to gain entry to
the upper floors of the building housing the
M.G.s. Rattray captured five paratroopers,
three machine guns, four rifles and three pistols.
Stone meanwhile stalked an adjacent M.G.
post, destroyed its crew with grenades and
silenced a heavy anti-tank gun. Ortona had
become an intensely personal battle with one
man pitted against the wits and daring of
another. 17
Late on December 24th, a draft of seventyfive reinforcements arrived mostly from the
Cape Breton Highlanders. There has been
much controversy over the quality of
reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Division
and for that matter the entire Canadian Army
effort from 1939-45. In the interviews
conducted with Major A.J. Rudd, Colonel J.R.
Stone, and Major-General G.G. Brown, all
participants in the Italian campaign, there is
unequivocal agreement that the quality of
reinforcements, at least in December 1943,
was excellent; however, their numbers were
almost always disappointing. General Brown
remembers the Cape Bretoners as
"tremendously good soldiers, we considered
them brothers-in-arms and perhaps it was a
kinship borne out of the knowledge of a mutual
suffering in the depression; it is hard to say,
but they were fine soldiers in every respect. "18

18
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The Cape Breton draft was welcomed by a
seniorN.C.O. with the cheery intimation, "Just
in time to hang up your stockings." 19 But this
was a Christmas with neither peace nor
goodwill. The battle continued and the
Edmontons increased their resolve. The
Edmonton War Diary notes: "this is our fifth
Christmas on Active Service and the fiercest
fighting so far encountered continued
throughout the day" Colonel J .R. Stone recalls
the day:
On Christmas Day 1943, I was on the main street of
Ortona, directing a local attack ordered by my C.O.
Three of my men were killed on the street before 0900
hrs. My Christmas dinner was a cold pork chop
brought forward on a "Bren" carrier. A most unhappy
day.2o

Major-General G.G. Brown remembers:
I was in a battered old house which was our H.Q. a
few blocks from the enemy. We rotated in sections
back a few hundred yards for Christmas dinner. We
set a table with liberated china and tablecloths and
even nameplates for seating. Pork
chops on our plate, canned carrot
pudding, nuts, candy, wine; we
tried to encrust it with some of the
ideals from home. Whether it
worked or not, I'm not qutte sure.
The fighting went on, we had to
change the barrel three times on
one of the six-pounders. 21

The Padre of the Seaforths noted his Christmas
observations:
The tables filled and emptied and filled again, and I
saw many a tense face relax in the warmth within the
walls of the battlescarred church. What a concert of
noise! As relief and relaxation took hold, the talk
became louder and greetings and jokes were shouted.
The cookers hissed and sizzled behind the altar and
the plates clattered as they were cleared from the
tables and piled high on the altar itself. Desecration
of the Lord's Table? It did not strike me so. Above the
din one could sometimes hear machine-gun fire and
shells. It was wonderful to hear so much laughter so
close to so much death and suffering. I don't know
how many remembered Christ that day but I feel that
most of these men, whether they knew it or not,
remembered the things Christ stood for compassion, faithfulness to a cause, self-sacrifice. 23

Of the fighting in Ortona on Christmas day the
war diary of the Tenth German Army reported:
In Orton a the enemy attacked all day long with about
one brigade supported by 10 tanks. In very hard
house to house fighting and at the cost of heavy

Major A. J. Rudd recalls:
We were just down from St.
Tommaso Square. We rotated back
to the diner. We were out for about
half-an-hour and then it was back
to the fight. You must remember a
soldier has very little appetite when
in the middle of battle. 22

After being wounded, Sergeant
Johnny Marchand is being placed on
a stretcher by soldiers andfirst-aid
men of the Three Rivers Tank Regiment. Ortona, 21 December 1943.
(Photo byT.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163927)
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casualties to his own troops, the enemy advanced to
the market square in the southwestern part of the
town. The battle there is especially violent. Our own
troops are using flame throwers, hand grenades and
the new bazookas (ofenrohre). 24

The aftermath of battle - Refugees retum to their
homes in Ortona, 30 December 1943.
(Photo byT.F. Rowe/NAC PA 163938)

It is interesting to note in the above quote
the reference to a "brigade" (i.e. at least 3
battalions). At this point the Canadians had
only the Edmontons and Seaforths, at 60 per
cent strength, in Ortona. The German War
Diaries consistently overestimated Allied
strength, both in land forces and the weight of
artillery and air bombardments. The reasons
for this are numerous; the most obvious one is
that it offered a creditable excuse for failure.
During the Ortona engagement all evidence
suggests that both sides were relatively even in
ground forces. Tank, artillery and air
participation was severely restricted.

On December 28th, the Edmonton War
Diary matter-of-factly reports the end of the
battle:

Throughout December 26th the grim
struggle continued with the Loyal Edmontons
inching forward to their final objectives. The
Piazza Tomasso, the last of the great squares,
was in sight. On that day the enemy succeeded
in the last ofhis deadly stratagems. Lieutenant
E.B. Allen, with twenty-three men, occupied a
building which the enemy had· mined before
abandoning. A heavy charge brought it down.
The Pioneers who rushed forward to dig them
out were harassed by grenades. Corporal G.E.
O'Neil counterattacked and single-handedly
drove out the grenade throwers. Sergeant
Sandy McLaren recalled the incident:
By this time the men were all very tired as they had
very little sleep. I got my men into a large house right
across the street from the enemy so we had to be on
guard all the time. That night I was called to
company headquarters where I met Lieutenant E.B.
Allan and Company Sergeant-Major L. Paquette. I
was told that I was being promoted to company
Sergeant-Major ofB Company and Allan and Paquette
were taking over my platoon. I explained the situation
to Lieutenant Allan and told him the men were dead
tired. I also told him the guard would have to be kept
awake because there were tunnels from house to
house. They then went to the house and I stayed at
headquarters. At 0500 the next morning we heard a
blast and went to the house where my men were
stationed. The house had been levelled and my men
buried in the rubble. 25

At 0945 hrs. this morning our patrols reported that
the area of the "Ortona Fort" had been cleared of the
enemy. Shortly thereafter, our eight-day battle for
the city came to an end when it was declared clear of
the Hun. 26

The Regiment returned immediately to
excavating the demolished buildingwhereAllan
had disappeared with his platoon, but no
additional survivors were found. Matthew
Halton tells of accompanying Lieutenant Frank
Whiting ofVictoria, on the final patrol to secure
Ortona:
We went with him, high strung as cats, through
mines and dead men and appalling ruin. We heard
laughter and turned and saw some Canadian soldiers
talking in a basement to some Italian girls, laughter
and girls there in Ortona ... I saw a Canadian lying
in a marksman's position on a pile of rubble. It was
five seconds before I realized he was dead. He was
still aiming a rifle, a locket of hair hung freely down
his neck. It was moving back and forth in the brisk
cold wind. The Germans were superb - admit it
freely- and when that is said, our Canadians were
better. The Boche had all the cards - the prepared
positions, the hundreds of booby traps and mines;
we had to seek him out and kill him man by man. And
so, on these fearful notes the Battle of the Moro River
ends .... 27

The cost had been heavy. Loyal Edmonton
Regiment casualties for the eight days
numbered 172 with 63 dead. The Seaforth
Highlanders lost 41 killed and 62 wounded.
German casualties were 455 including 168
killed. 28
The advance from the Moro River had cost
the 1st Division 176 officers and 2,163 other
ranks killed and wounded. Sickness, including
battle exhaustion, had reduced divisional
strength by a further 1,617. The 8th Indian
Division with 3,400 casualties and the New
Zealand Division with 1,200 were in a similar
state. 29 Every infantry battalion had suffered
50 per cent casualties in the rifle companies. 30
These are the cold statistics. The inevitable

20
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roster of war. We must look beyond the grim
toll to assess the Canadian infantryman's
accomplishments at the Moro River.

George Brown, who had leamed so much
as a lieutenant from Major Stone in Ortona,
outlines the essence of good leadership:

In the battle for Ortona, every bullet did not
hit its mark. The ammunition expenditure of
the Loyal Edmontons for eight days attests to
this fact and points out, in a rather detached
way, the intensity of battle: 31

Stone was an exceptional leader. He took his time to
carefully survey the battlefield. He controlled his
men in battle by his voice or by radio when possible,
but most often by voice. He watched them, directed
them, getting them on. He was a tremendous example
of how a good leader with good control could inspire
the confidence of his men. 36

Anti-tank shells
Three-inch mortars
Two-inch mortars
P. 303 S.A.A.
Thompson sub-machine gun rounds
No. 36 hand grenades
No. 77 hand grenades

918
4,050
2,000
57,000
4,800
600
700

After Ortona morale was initially high. An
important component of the Canadians' attitude
was a sense of their exclusivity, of being
members of an unique brotherhood. As MajorGeneral Brown put it:

There are often more subtle indicators of the
characteristics of a battle and they are just as
telling in their own right. The Edmonton's War
Diary of December 28th notes:

There emerged an aura of a no-nonsense unit that
knew what it was doing. It was hard to put your
finger on any single phenomenon except perhaps the
great mutual confidence that seemed to abound.
Great respect for one another and yet good discipline
as well, no first name slap-on-the-back relationship,
but a healthy one between the officers, men and
N.C.O.s. A quiet confidence built upon the rock of
accomplishment. 37

As a rule the foe either removes his dead or buries
them on the spot. Ortona has been the exception, for
approximately 100 dead have been left dying due to
his hasty withdrawal. 32

In
reviewing
the
statistics
of
neuropsychiatric (battle exhaustion) casualties
for the 1st Canadian Division's infantry brigades
for the period 28 November to 12 February
1944, it becomes evident that of all infantry
battalions the Loyal Edmontons enjoyed the
smallest ratio of these types of casualties. Low
ratios were maintained by the 2nd Brigade
throughout the Italian campaign. 33 There are,
of course, many factors which ultimately came
to bear upon this figure. An Army psychiatrist
offered one explanation: "The emotional ties
among the men, and between the men and
their officers, is the single most potent factor in
preventing breakdown. "34 The factors which
help to make a man a soldier in the moral sense
are, according to B.H. McNeel, his sense of
personal value and responsibility and the timehonoured sentiments of pride in his regiment
and respect for his leaders. From the day he is
inducted, the process of incorporating him as
a person into the fighting forces must begin.
Whatever one thinks ofthe thesis that mediocre
men can be made effective by good leadership,
the fact remains that the fewest behaviour
problems arise in well-led regiments. 35
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